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ABSTRACT
UCLA Law Professor Adam Winkler has published an excellent book on
the history of corporate rights. The book, We the Corporations: How American
Businesses Won Their Civil Rights, “reveals the secret history of one of America’s
most successful yet least-known ‘civil rights movements’—the centuries-long struggle for
equal rights for corporations.” The book has been highly praised by some of the greatest
minds in corporate and constitutional law, and the praise is well-deserved. However,
the book is not without its controversial assertions, particularly when it comes to its
characterizations of some of the key components of corporate personhood and corporate
personality theory. This response essay will focus on unpacking some of these assertions,
hopefully helping to ensure that advocates who rely on the book will be informed as to
alternative approaches to key issues.
Specifically, the propositions examined in this Essay include: (1) “corporate
personhood has played only a small role in the expansion of constitutional rights to
corporations,” (2) “the history of corporate rights has largely been a struggle between
the disparate poles of personhood and piercing,” and (3) “in Dartmouth College. . . .
Marshall was saying that corporations were too ethereal to be the basis for constitutional
rights and that, instead, the court should focus on the corporation’s members.”
While I provide reasons for questioning each of the foregoing propositions, I
ultimately conclude that none of these criticisms undermine the book’s overall value.
Most, if not all, of the issues I identify may be viewed as providing alternative ways of
thinking about what is essentially the same perspective. However, advocates relying on
Winkler’s book who have not been alerted to these criticisms risk being caught off guard
in ways that will undermine their objectives. Thus, this Essay will hopefully provide a
useful adjunct to Winkler’s impressive work.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
UCLA Law Professor Adam Winkler has published an excellent
book on the history of corporate rights. The book, We the Corporations:
How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights, “reveals the secret history of
one of America’s most successful yet least-known ‘civil rights movements’
– the centuries-long struggle for equal rights for corporations.”1 The book
has been highly praised by some of the greatest minds in corporate and
constitutional law,2 and the praise is well-deserved. However, the book is
not without its controversial assertions, particularly when it comes to its
characterizations of some of the key components of corporate
personhood and corporate personality theory.3 This review will focus on
unpacking some of these assertions, hopefully helping to ensure that
ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR
CIVIL RIGHTS (2018).
1

Id. at back cover (quoting, among others, The Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., Chief Justice,
Delaware Supreme Court (“In this compelling book, Adam Winkler exposes the stark
distance between our nation’s rhetorical commitment to equal justice under law and the
reality of corporate power.”), and Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, Jesse H. Choper
Distinguished Professor of Law, Berkeley Law (“This is a brilliant, beautifully written
book . . .. Any future discussion of rights for corporations will be shaped by this
wonderful book.”)).
2

Corporate personhood may be understood as a binary concept, which is to say a
corporation either is or is not a person for purposes of a particular statute or
Constitutional provision. Corporate personality theory, on the other hand, may be
understood as answering the subsequent; and perhaps more important question: What
kind of person is the corporation?
3
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advocates who rely on the book will be informed as to alternative
approaches to key issues.
Following this Introduction, Part II will provide a brief overview
of “We the Corporations.” Part III will then provide an overview of the
traditional theories of corporate personhood: concession theory (also
known as artificial entity theory), aggregate theory (often associated with
the nexus-of-contracts theory), and real entity theory (also known as
natural entity theory). This part will also address the functional/realist
approach to corporate personhood, which argues that focusing on
corporate personhood as a means of determining corporate rights is
unhelpful, and that we should rather be simply asking whether granting
corporations the right at issue will advance the goals that underlie the
existence of the right in the first place. Finally, this part will discuss other
more recent or less mainstream theories of corporate personhood.
Part IV will then discuss whether Winkler is correct to view the
expansion of corporate rights as being a function of courts ignoring
corporate personhood and/or piercing the corporate veil, or whether it is
better to take the view that courts are simply applying the aggregate or real
entity view of the corporation in these cases. Part V will then examine
Winkler’s interpretation of the famous Dartmouth College case,4 wherein
Chief Justice Marshall described the corporation as “an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law,”5 and
wherein he also noted that, because a corporations is “. . . the mere
creature of law” it “possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it. . . ,” and that the “. . . objects for which a
corporation is created are universally such as the government wishes to
promote.”6 Is it correct, as Winkler asserts, that all the scholars who have
repeatedly cited Dartmouth College as representative of the concession
theory of the corporation were wrong?
Part VI will then examine whether critics of opinions like Citizens
United7 are correct (1) to blame corporate personhood for what they see
as the corrupt expansion of corporate rights, and (2) to pursue the
reduction or elimination of personhood rights for corporations as a
remedy. Perhaps, as Winkler suggests, their hope lies rather in the opposite
4

Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).

5

Id. at 659.

6

Id at 637.

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that “the
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate
identity”).
7
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direction, and a robust corporate personhood is the means by which
corporate obligations under the law are strengthened and expanded. This
part will also discuss the difference between personhood as a basis for
standing (e.g., determining whether corporations are persons for purposes
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act) as opposed to a means of
determining how closely corporate rights should track the rights of natural
persons after standing has been granted (e.g., determining whether
corporations are akin to classes of persons that have diminished rights in
certain contexts—like in the case of the political speech rights of
government employees). Finally, I provide concluding remarks in
Part VII.
While I provide reasons for questioning a number of Winkler’s
propositions, I ultimately conclude that none of these criticisms
undermine the book’s overall value. Most, if not all, of the issues I identify
may be viewed as providing alternative ways of talking about what is
essentially the same perspective. However, advocates relying on Winkler’s
book who have not been alerted to these criticisms risk being caught off
guard in ways that will undermine their objectives. Thus, this Essay will
hopefully provide a useful adjunct to Winkler’s impressive work.
II.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF “WE THE CORPORATIONS”

“We the Corporations” is 471 pages long. While the table of
contents is broken into ten chapters, a “Chronology of Corporate Rights”
at the end of the book provides perhaps a better basis for a brief overview,
as it does broadly track the arc of the book. Winkler starts the chronology
at 300 BC, noting that this is when the Romans “invent [an] early version
of the corporation to enable groups of people to hold property together.”8
From here, this first part of the chronology, entitled “Before the
Constitution,” notes that in 1607 “The Virginia Company found[ed]
England’s first permanent colony as a business venture.”9 This part of the
chronology also notes that in 1758 William Blackstone, the influential
English scholar, “describes the corporation as an ‘artificial person’ with a
separate legal identity and certain rights, including property, contract, and
access to court.”10
The next section of the chronology, entitled “First Corporate
Rights Cases, 1787–1860,” includes the 1809 case of Bank of the United

8

WINKLER, supra note 2, at 399.

9

Id.

10

Id. at 399–400.
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States v. Deveaux,11 the 1819 case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,12 and
three cases spanning 1837 to 1853 wherein the Taney court slows down
the march to ever-expanding corporate rights.13 Most of these cases are
discussed in more detail later in this Essay.
Next comes the section “Property but Not Liberty Rights, 18611953,” which covers a period including three Supreme Court cases that
end up announcing that “corporations are persons entitled to equal
protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.”14 Perhaps
the most fascinating aspect of these cases is that there was never any
express analysis of the issue in the opinions, and the apparent basis for
the conclusion was a lie:
In December of 1882, Roscoe Conkling . . . appeared
before the justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States to argue that corporations like his client, the
Southern Pacific Railroad Company, were entitled to equal
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Conkling’s
claim was remarkable. The Fourteenth Amendment had
been adopted after the Civil War to guarantee the rights of
the freed slaves, not to protect corporations. Conkling,
however, had unusual credibility with the justices. . . . And
when it came to the history surrounding the drafting of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Conkling’s expertise was
unparalleled. As a member of Congress during
Reconstruction, Conkling had been on the very committee
that wrote the amendment. . . . To back up his improbable
story, Conkling produced a musty, never-before-published
Id. at 400 (“Horace Binney persuades the Supreme Court to recognize corporations’
right of access to federal court under Article III of the Constitution and the Judiciary
Act.”).
11

Id. (“The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall adopts Daniel Webster’s
argument that corporations are private entities, akin to individuals, under the contract
clause of the Constitution.”).
12

Id. at 400 (citing Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge,
36 U.S. 420 (1837) (refusing “to read monopoly privileges into a corporate charter”);
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839) (holding that “corporations do not have the
privileges and immunities of citizens under the comity clause of Article IV of the
Constitution”); Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1854) (using
corporate personhood “to make corporations more easily amenable to suit in federal
court”).
13

Id. at 400–01 (citing San Mateo Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 116 US. 138 (1885); Santa Clara
Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888)).
14
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journal that purported to detail his committee’s
deliberations. A close look at the journal, Conkling
suggested, would show that while the nation was focused
on the rights of the freedmen, he and the other members
of Congress had also been worried about laws that unduly
burdened business. It was for this very reason that the
Fourteenth Amendment used the word person. An early
draft of the amendment had guaranteed the rights of
“citizens,” Conkling said, but the language was later
changed specifically to include corporations . . . . There
was just one small problem with Conkling’s account of the
drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment: it was not true.15
This portion of the chronology also includes the Lochner era (18971936),16 which Winkler describes as “often friendly to business”, but also
as establishing “a new boundary on the rights of corporations, entitling
them to property rights but not liberty rights.”17 The Supreme Court case
of Hale v. Henkel,18 holding that “. . . corporations do not have a Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination but do have a limited Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures,”19 is also
included, as is the Tillman Act.20
Finally, Winkler’s chronology covers the period entitled “Liberty
Rights, 1936—current,” which includes the cases Grosjean v. American Press
15

Id. at xiii–xiv.

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding that statute limiting
employment in bakeries to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day “necessarily interferes
with the right of contract between the employer and employees, concerning the number
of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer”), overruled in part by
Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. State of Mo., 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963); abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See also
Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C.
L. REV. 1 (1991) (“Legal scholars . . . have . . . depicted the Lochner era as a deviant period
during which the Supreme Court broke from the constitutionalism that the Marshall
Court established and the New Deal Court restored. They maintain that the Lochner era
Court, which struck down much . . . industrial regulation . . . overprotect[ed] private
property.”).
16

17

WINKLER, supra note 9, at 401.

201 U.S. 43 (1906), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New
York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
18

19

WINKLER, supra note 9, at 401.

Id. (noting that “[a]fter the revelations of the Great Wall Street Scandal, Congress
enact[ed] the first modern campaign finance law, a ban on corporate contributions to
federal candidates”).
20
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Company (1936),21 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (1958),22 Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1971),23 First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978),24 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
(2010),25 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014).26 (I will discuss at
least some of these cases in more detail below.) This section also notes
that Lewis Powell, months before being nominated to the Supreme Court,
authored “an influential memorandum to the Chamber of Commerce
outlining how business could better defend its interests.”27
Having thus provided a brief overview of the scope of “We the
Corporations,” we will now turn to laying the foundation for the rest of
this Essay by reviewing the traditional theories of corporate personhood.
III.

AN OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL THEORIES
OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD

In this Part III, I will review what at least some refer to as the
traditional theories of corporate personhood: concession theory,
aggregate theory, and real entity theory.28 By way of introduction,
concession theory (also known as artificial entity theory) views the
corporation as a creature of the state that is presumed to be subject to
much greater regulation than citizens. Aggregate theory (often aligned
with the nexus-of-contracts theory of the corporation) 29 views the
Id. at 402 (“The Supreme Court rules that the First Amendment right of freedom of
the press extends to newspaper corporations”).
21

Id. (“The Supreme Court holds that a voluntary membership corporation can assert its
members’ rights of association”).
22

Id. (“Siding with Ralph Nader’s consumer rights group, the Supreme Court adopts the
listeners’ rights theory of free speech to protect commercial speech”).
23

Id. (“Justice Lewis Powell authors the Supreme Court’s opinion recognizing
corporations have a free speech right to influence ballot measure campaigns”).
24

Id. at 403 (“The Supreme Court holds that corporations have a First Amendment right
to spend money to influence candidate elections”).
25

Id. (“The Supreme Court declares corporations have religious freedom under a federal
statute.”).
26

27

Id. at 402.

S.I. Strong, Congress and Commercial Trusts: Dealing with Diversity Jurisdiction Post-Americold,
69 FLA. L. REV. 1021, 1057 (2017) (identifying “the three traditional theories of corporate
personhood” as “the concession theory, the aggregate theory, and the real entity theory”);
See Carliss N. Chatman, The Corporate Personhood Two-Step, 18 NEV. L. J. 811, 819 (2018)
(identifying “the major theories of corporate personhood” as “the artificial
entity/concession theory, aggregate theory, or real entity theory”).
28

Cf. Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Regulation, 11 TENN. J. BUS.
L. 135, 138 (2009) (“The most problematic portion of the nexus-of-contracts framework
29

1016

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 20

corporation as merely an association of individuals (typically, the
shareholders) who, like many other associations, can assert a variety of
rights against government regulation, even when acting in the corporate
form.30 Finally, real entity theory is quite similar to aggregate theory,
except that it views the relevant association as either broader than or
different from an association of shareholders in order to, among other
things, avoid jeopardizing the shareholders’ limited liability.31 For example,
someone advancing a real entity view of the firm might identify the
relevant association as the board of directors.32 As a general matter,
aggregate theory and real entity theory tend to view corporations as
standing on the private side of the public-private divide, while concession
theory tends to view corporations as standing more on the public side.33
In addition to the foregoing, I will also discuss the functional approach to
corporate personhood, which argues that focusing on corporate
personhood as a means of determining corporate rights is unhelpful, and
that we should rather be simply asking whether granting corporations the
right at issue will advance the goals that underlie the existence of the right
to begin with. Finally, I will note some other more recent or less
mainstream theories of corporate personhood.
A.

Concession / Artificial Entity Theory

for me has been the normative claim that many proponents of the framework have
proffered: that, because the corporation can be viewed as this bundle of privately ordered
contracts, regulation is largely unnecessary and undesirable.”).
Cf. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus
of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2011) (“Corporations are not
creatures of contract. One cannot contract to form a corporation. The individuals
involved must apply to a state for permission to create such an entity. The fact that this
permission is readily granted . . . does not change the fact that permission is required.”).
30

Cf. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 586 (1839) (“If it were held . . . that the
members of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals carrying on business in
their corporate name . . . they . . . would be . . . a mere partnership in business, in which
each stockholder would be liable to the whole extent of his property for the debts of the
corporation . . . .”).
31

But cf., Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV.
353, 365 (2017) (“The work of German legal theorist Otto von Gierke played a key role
in the development of real entity theory. Gierke posited that groups have a ‘collective
spirit’ that gives them an identity separate and apart from the individuals composing
them.”).
32

Cf. Ronit Donyets-Kedar, Challenging Corporate Personhood Theory: Reclaiming the Public, 11
L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 61, 80 (2017) (“In a deep sense, . . . corporate personhood
jurisprudence feeds off the more general private/public divide.”).
33
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In the 1819 Supreme Court case of Dartmouth College, Chief Justice
Marshall famously stated that:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly,
or as incidental to its very existence. . . . The objects for
which a corporation is created are universally such as the
government wishes to promote.34
This formulation has been commonly associated with concession
theory, also known as artificial entity theory.35 We will later revisit the claim
that Dartmouth College is representative of concession theory, as this is one
of the places where Winkler parts ways with what I would describe as the
conventional view, but for now it is simply worth noting that the artificial
entity / concession theory grants the state, as creator of the corporate
fiction, great dominion to regulate its creation in furtherance of the public
interest.36
How might concession theory’s greater deference to government
regulation of corporations play out in practice? Beyond the most
common application of simply citing the state-created nature of
corporations as inherent support for regulation, I have previously
suggested that adoption of concession theory could lead to a type of
burden shifting:
This deference might play out in application by, for
example, placing the burden of proof in a particular case
34

Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636–37 (1819).

J.W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 9 (1970) (describing the original “standard formula” as one
wherein the state “not only gave an indispensable consent, but itself created . . . any
business association which took the corporate form,” and noting that “[b]orrowing from
Coke and Blackstone, Marshall gave this view classic expression” in Dartmouth College);
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 72 n.36 (1992) (citing Dartmouth College in connection
with discussion of concession theory of the corporation); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens
United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1006 (2010) (“This language reflects
the artificial entity view of the corporation.”) (quoting Dartmouth College, at 636).
35

Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 933 (1984)
(“the concession approach is perceived to support more extensive regulation of
corporations”); Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 183, 212
(2004) (“corporations . . . historically have been treated as creatures of law and therefore
have been particularly vulnerable to regulation”).
36
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on the party seeking to avoid government regulation of
corporations. For example, in Citizens United, both Justice
Scalia and Justice Stevens believed the other had the
burden of proving their preferred interpretation of the
Framers’ attitude toward corporations and the
implications thereof for interpreting the scope of the First
Amendment. . . . [C]oncession theory . . . would favor
placing the burden here on Justice Scalia . . . .37
In addition, concession theory could justify a less onerous scrutiny of
government regulation of corporations generally, essentially expanding
the commercial speech doctrine to cover all corporate speech.38
As a hopefully relevant aside, it may be worth noting that
proponents of deregulation often cite the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions as a bar to the type of regulation that concession theory
arguably supports. As Kathleen Sullivan describes it,
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that
government may not grant a benefit on the condition that
the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the
government may withhold that benefit altogether. It
reflects the triumph of the view that government may not
do indirectly what it may not do directly over the view that
the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser
power to impose a condition on its receipt.39
However, as I have written previously in my article Rehabilitating Concession
Theory, “there are at least five good reasons to conclude that the
37

Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 334–35 (2014).

Jason Zenor, A Reckless Disregard for the Truth? The Constitutional Right to Lie in Politics, 38
CAMPBELL L. REV. 41, 66 (2016) (“[U]nder the Central Hudson test, commercial speech
that is false is never protected. . .. All other ‘truthful’ commercial speech must survive an
intermediate level of scrutiny.”) (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563). Cf. Leslie Kendrick,
First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1211 (2015) (“First
Amendment doctrine is rife with specialized tests . . .. For a lower court genuinely trying
to . . . apply Supreme Court case law, it may be difficult to decide whether . . . a required
disclosure . . . merits rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny . . ., or . . . strict scrutiny
. . ..”); Joseph K. Leahy, Intermediate Scrutiny for Corporate Political Contributions, 44 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1119 (2017) (“This Article departs from the scholarly consensus that courts
should apply the business judgment rule to review corporate political contributions.
Instead, courts should apply the intermediate level of scrutiny--the Unocal test--that is
applied whenever management adopts defensive measures in the face of a hostile
takeover.”).
38

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989)
(“The Lochner Court first fashioned the doctrine.”).
39
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unconstitutional conditions doctrine would not constitute an
insurmountable obstacle to the viability of concession theory,”40 including
that “it is unclear what . . . would be added to the relevant analysis by
applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because, like the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment . . . , it does not actually constitute
a complete bar to government action, but rather requires the government
to satisfy some form of heightened scrutiny.”41 While further details of
those arguments are beyond the scope of this Essay, I encourage the
interested reader to review the relevant parts of that article directly.
In addition, a “listeners’ rights” rationale has been employed to
shift the focus of analysis from the corporate speaker to the natural
persons who have a right to be informed, and this was one of the key
arguments underlying Citizens United, wherein the Supreme Court
concluded that “the Government may not suppress political speech on the
basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”42 However, “even if one
understands the Citizens United opinion to be fundamentally about
listeners’ rights, there remains the question whether there is something
about corporations that would justify including them in the line of cases
carving out exceptions for particular identity-based restrictions on
speech.”43 As I have also written elsewhere, the Citizens United majority
“was well aware of this line of cases upholding identity-based speech
restrictions, but dismissed them as irrelevant by simply asserting that ‘[t]he
corporate independent expenditures at issue in this case . . . would not
interfere with governmental functions, so these cases are inapposite.’”44
Again, I flesh this analysis out further in my previously published
Rehabilitating Concession Theory article, but suffice it to say that a bald
assertion that unleashing the full force of corporate treasuries on our
political debates “would not interfere with governmental functions” is a
hard pill for many to swallow.45
40

Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 354 (2014).

41

Id. at 355.

42

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).

43

Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 349 (2014).

Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 351 (2014)
(quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010)).
44

Cf. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Thoughts on the Corporation As A Person for Purposes of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 137, 143 (2011) (“Under the Court’s view
in Citizens United, it appears that once one concludes that a corporation is a person, it is
a person for all purposes, bar none. As the Stevens opinion points out, this ignores policy
underpinnings of the various laws that may use the concept of corporate personhood.”).
45
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Finally, there are a number of arguments routinely trotted out to
support the contention that concession theory is obviously untenable,
such as “the argument that concession theory died along with special
charters.”46 I believe I also offer some worthwhile rebuttals to these and
related arguments in the Rehabilitating Concession Theory article referenced
above, and the interested reader is again encouraged to look there for
further analysis.47
B.

Aggregate / Nexus-of-Contracts Theory

In 1809, before Dartmouth College, Chief Justice Marshall authored
another opinion, Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, which has been repeatedly
described as embracing the aggregate theory of the corporation.48 As
Elizabeth Pollman describes it, in Deveaux “the Court made clear that a
corporation is not a ‘citizen’ for purposes of Article III diversity
jurisdiction . . . but that the Court could look to the natural persons
composing a corporation and find that diversity jurisdiction exists where
there is complete diversity of citizenship between the corporate
shareholders and the opposing party.”49 In other words, “corporations are
Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 346 (2014) (“As
we moved from a special charter system of incorporation to a system based upon
enabling acts, which required little more than a simple filing for practically any person
who desired to incorporate to do so, the notion that some special grant was being
conveyed lost some of its luster.”). But cf. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The
Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127,
1130 (2011) (“Corporations are not creatures of contract. One cannot contract to form
a corporation. The individuals involved must apply to a state for permission to create
such an entity. The fact that this permission is readily granted ... does not change the fact
that permission is required.”).
46

Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 342–43, 346,
349 (2014) (addressing “four arguments frequently advanced to undermine concession
theory: (1) that corporate theory is excessively malleable; (2) that concession theory died
along with special charters; (3) that listeners’ rights trump corporate theory; and (4) that
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine trumps concession theory”).
47

Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Neofeudalism: The Surprising Foundations of Corporate Constitutional
Rights, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 181–82 (2017) (“Deveaux contended that for diversity
purposes a corporation should be seen as its members, in what has come to be known as
the ‘aggregate’ theory.”). Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form,
2010 Wis. L. Rev. 999, 1008 (2010) (“How can one explain the shift in Marshall’s view of
the corporation from aggregate (Deveaux) to artificial (Dartmouth College) . . .? In part, it
stems from the circumstances of these particular cases.”).
48

Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 658 (2016).
But see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.
J. 1593, 1598 (1988) (“The associational view of corporate citizenship dominated the
Marshall period until Deveaux was overruled by the Taney Court in Louisville, Cincinnati &
Charleston Railroad v. Letson. Letson held that a corporation should be ‘deemed . . . a person,
49
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people, my friend,”50 and the aggregate theory of corporate personhood
focuses on these people in order to view corporations as a mere
“associations of citizens”51 who should not have their freedom impinged
simply because they choose to associate via the corporate form. However,
blurring the line between shareholders and the corporation in which they
own shares creates at least one very serious problem for shareholders,
which will be discussed next.
C.

Real / Natural Entity Theory

Critics of artificial entity / concession theory argue that it
overstates the government’s role in the creation of corporations, places
the corporation too far on the public side of the public-private divide, and
subjects the corporation to excessive/inefficient regulation. Critics of
aggregate theory, on the other hand, take the opposite side on these
arguments, and point out further that the logical conclusion of aggregate
theory is the loss of limited liability for shareholders, since that limited
liability is arguably rooted in the corporate separation of ownership from
control because the corporation, as a separate entity, stands between the
shareholders’ personal assets and the corporation’s creditors. 52 Thus, when
one characterizes the corporation as a mere association of individuals, one

although an artifical person,’ and ‘an inhabitant of the same state, for the purposes of its
incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a natural
person.’”) (citing 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844)). Cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 85
(2010) (“In 1928, this Court made clear that the “state of incorporation” rule was
virtually absolute.”).
Frank James, Romney’s ‘Corporations Are People’ A Gift To Political Foes, IT’S ALL POLITICS
(August 11, 2011), available at
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2011/08/11/139551684/romneyscorporations-are-people-getting-lots-of-mileage.
50

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (“. . .certain disfavored associations
of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging
in the same political speech”); Id. at 343 (“The Court has thus rejected the argument that
political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under
the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’”).
51

See Thomas C. Folsom, Evaluating Supernatural Law: An Inquiry into the Health of Nations
(The Restatement of the Obvious, Part II), 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 105, 148 (2008) (“Limited
liability entities are based on the moral intuition of nonagency because there is separation
of ownership from control.”). Cf. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114,
1179 (10th Cir. 2013) (Matheson, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
structural barriers of corporate law give me pause about whether the plaintiffs can have
their corporate veil and pierce it too.”), aff ’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
52
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is basically back to a partnership, wherein the partners are jointly and
severally liable for the debts of the business.53
Real entity theory tries to address these concerns by viewing the
corporation as an entity that is separate from both the state and the
shareholders.54 The theory has a variety of incarnations, but perhaps the
simplest modern view is to align the corporation with the board of
directors.55 However, this view ultimately favors those who want to limit
the regulation of corporations, since it still places the corporation on the
private side of the public-private divide, merely replacing the privatecitizen shareholders with the private-citizen directors.56 The Supreme
Court case most commonly cited as adopting the real entity theory is the
1906 case of Hale v. Henkel, wherein the court extended Fourth
Amendment protections to corporations (though it denied corporations
the protection of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).57
Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Leo E. Strine, Citizens United As Bad Corporate Law (2018)
[NOTE: This is an article, not a book.], (arguing that corporations are not associations
of citizens because, among other things, “the treatment of corporations as separate legal
entities is what distinguishes corporations from general partnerships and sole
proprietorships and what justifies the legal notion of ‘limited liability’ and other central
characteristics of the corporate form, such as the ability to contract and to sue and be
sued”), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118.
53

Cf. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 914 n.174 (2011) (“The real entity theory is
also known as the natural entity theory.”).
54

Compare Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV.
353, 359 (2017) (“The work of German legal theorist Otto von Gierke played a key role
in the development of real entity theory. Gierke posited that groups have a ‘collective
spirit’ that gives them an identity separate and apart from the individuals composing
them.”), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 560 (2003) (“[T]o the limited extent to which the
corporation is properly understood as a real entity, it is the board of directors that
personifies the corporate entity.”). But cf. Stephen Bainbridge, Is the corporation an entity?
With application to the SCOTUS PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 4, 2012) (“this passage
should not be understood as embracing either the real or artificial entity theory of the
corporation”), available at
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/04/is-thecorporation-a-entity.html.
55

But cf. Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational “Real Entity”
Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 588 (1989) (“Gierke established the understanding that
the real entity theory was pro-liability while the fiction theory was anti-liability.”).
56

Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the
Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 785, 806–07 (2013) (“beginning with Hale v. Henkel
in 1905, the Supreme Court began articulating real entity theory arguments for the
extension of further constitutional rights to corporations”).
57
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The Functional / Realist Approach

In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journal
entitled The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality,58 wherein he
concluded that “each theory” of group personality “has been used to
serve ... opposing ends.”59 His analysis was so compelling, that many cite
his article as ushering in a sort of Dark Ages for corporate personhood
theory, from which we have only recently emerged.60 This perspective has
led to a call for replacing a focus on corporate personhood theory with a
more functional analysis.61 As Elizabeth Pollman puts it:
[A] metaphor or philosophical conception of the
corporation is not helpful for the type of functional
analysis that the Court should conduct. The Court should
consider the purpose of the constitutional right at issue,
and whether it would promote the objectives of that right
to provide it to the corporation--and thereby to the people
underlying the corporation.62
However, in 1992 Morton Horwitz responded to Dewey’s criticism with
the following:
I wish to dispute Dewey’s conclusion that particular
conceptions of corporate personality were used just as
John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 669
(1926).
58

Id. at 669; see also, John Hasnas, Where Is Felix Cohen When We Need Him?: Transcendental
Nonsense and the Moral Responsibility of Corporations, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 55, 57 (2010)
(“Deciding cases by reifying the abstract concept of the corporation is a classic example
of transcendental nonsense.”) (discussing Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935)).
59

But cf. id. at 673 (arguing for enforcing “the value of eliminating the idea of personality
until the concrete facts and relations involved have been faced and stated on their own
account”) (second emphasis added); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1565, 1572 (2013) (“Dewey’s perceptive critique highlighted the fact that these
conceptions do not engage the interests that ground particular rights claims, nor do they
provide any sense of how those interests are implicated within corporations.”).
60

Cf. Harry G. Hutchison, Religious Liberty for Employers as Corporations, Natural Persons or
Mythical Beings? A Reply to Gans, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 537, 557 (2015) (“[S]cholars . . .
question whether corporate theory in the form of a metaphysical inquisition provides a
basis for courts to ascertain whether corporations are the kinds of beings that can or
should have rights, or instead, proffer a realist appraisal that looks at society’s interests
and the functional relations involved.”).
61

Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1631
(2011).
62
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easily to limit as to enhance corporate power. I hope to
show that, for example, the rise of a natural entity theory
of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating big
business and that none of the other theoretical alternatives
could provide as much sustenance to newly organized,
concentrated enterprise.63
As I have written elsewhere, to the extent Horwitz achieved his goal (and
there is good reason to believe he did), “it may well be the better view that
while corporate theory may not be able to precisely predict outcomes in
all cases, it is nonetheless meaningful in terms of eliminating certain
conclusions and allocating burdens.”64 Furthermore, to the extent a
functional approach to corporate rights is preferable to an approach
relying on theories of corporate personhood in whole or in part as a
normative matter, we still must confront the fact that decisions are
nonetheless being made on the basis of personhood/personality
characterizations as a positive matter,65 so to ignore the debate
surrounding these theories is to leave that application under-theorized.66
As I have written elsewhere:
[A]nyone in doubt of the power of corporate personality
theory in cases like this would do well to read, or re-read,
the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens United. I am
not alone in having argued that corporate personality
theory had a major role to play in the disposition of that
case. Imagine showing up to argue that case having
dismissed any role for corporate personality theory as too
indeterminate, only to find the justices engaging in a
heated debate about whether the corporation is better
treated as a mere association of citizens or creature of the
63

HORWITZ, supra note 36, at 68.

Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 343 (2014)
(providing additional critiques of the functional approach).
64

Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
95, 95–96 (1995) (“[R]egulation of corporations raises many issues concerning the
constitutional limits of government power. Although these issues generally have been
examined through the broad lens of constitutional law, their resolution has in fact often
depended on how the corporation is characterized.”).
65

See generally, Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s
Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831 (2013); cf. ERIC SEGALL, SUPREME
MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT
JUDGES 2–3 (2012) (“[B]ecause judges are governmental officials who exercise coercive
power, it is important that they explain their legal decisions with honesty and
transparency.”).
66
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state, along with opposing counsel ready to defend his or
her preferred view of the firm. One ignores corporate
personality theory in such cases at one’s own risk.67
E.

Other Theories of Corporate Personhood

The theories and approaches discussed above are not the only
ones available to choose from when trying to determine the proper scope
of corporate rights, though they may fairly be considered the dominant
ones. Two other approaches are perhaps worth mentioning here. First, it
might be argued that former Chief Justice Rehnquist espoused a unique
theory of the corporation and was perhaps one of the few Supreme Court
justices to do so. As I have written elsewhere:
Justice Rehnquist’s stand-alone dissent in Bellotti provides .
. . [an] example . . . of a Justice affirmatively adopting a
theory of the corporation for purposes of determining the
constitutional rights of corporations--though not via the
express adoption of one of the traditionally recognized
theories. Specifically, Justice Rehnquist relied on Justice
Marshall’s Dartmouth College opinion to conclude that:
“Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a
corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed
by natural persons . . . our inquiry must seek to determine
which constitutional protections are ‘incidental to its very
existence.”‘ Thus, while it may be true that “a corporation’s
right of commercial speech . . . might be considered
necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial
corporation[, i]t cannot be so readily concluded that the
right of political expression is equally necessary to carry
out the functions of a corporation organized for
commercial purposes.”68
Thus, then-Justice Rehnquist could perhaps be understood as advancing
an “incidental powers” view of corporate rights, with the relevant question
Stefan J. Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Opting Out of Shareholder
Wealth Maximization, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 415, 451–52 (2017).
67

Padfield, supra note 67, at 853. Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 828
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It is true. . . that recent decisions of this Court have
emphasized the interest of the public in receiving the information offered by the speaker
seeking protection. The free flow of information is in no way diminished by the
Commonwealth’s decision to permit the operation of business corporations with limited
rights of political expression. All natural persons, who owe their existence to a higher
sovereign than the Commonwealth, remain as free as before to engage in political
activity.”).
68
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being whether a particular right is “necessarily incidental to the business
of a commercial corporation.”69
Another new theory of corporate personhood worth mentioning
here is Eric Chaffee’s collaboration theory. As I have previously described
it:
Professor Chaffee’s collaboration theory views the
corporation as similar to a joint venture or partnership to
the extent that “the state and the individuals organizing,
operating, and owning a corporation are collaborating
within the corporate form, i.e., they are ‘[j]oint
adventurers’ within the contractual relationship that
generates the corporation.” This characterization
differentiates collaboration theory by imposing a
requirement that corporations seek pro-social ends
whenever the expected value of a transaction is
unknowable or the contemplated pro-social action is
shareholder wealth neutral.70
IV.

PIERCING OR IGNORING THE CORPORATE PERSON VERSUS
APPLYING AGGREGATE OR REAL ENTITY THEORY

In We the Corporations, Winkler barely mentions the traditional
theories of the corporation.71 Rather, he presents the relevant issue as one
of piercing versus personhood or, alternatively, ignoring versus respecting
corporate personhood. For example, he argues that “the history of
corporate rights has largely been a struggle between the disparate poles of
personhood and piercing.”72 Elsewhere, he states that when the Supreme
Court has “ignored the corporate form and looked to the rights of the
individuals who made up the corporation, the rulings naturally tended to
give corporations nearly all the same rights as individuals.”73
Thus, we are left with two competing characterizations. On the
one hand, we might characterize the relevant cases as acknowledging
corporate personhood while applying the aggregate or real entity view to
69

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 825 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

Padfield, supra note 68, at 448 (quoting Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 353, 374 (2017)).
70

For example, a search of the Kindle version of the book revealed that the word
“concession” does not appear once.
71

72

ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 62 (2018).

WINKLER, supra note 73, at 62 (concluding that: “Expansive constitutional rights for
corporations were built into the logic of piercing.”).
73
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focus on the natural persons making up the corporation. On the other
hand, we can characterize the analysis as ignoring corporate personhood,
and piercing the corporate veil to get at those same natural persons.
However, at least one of the problems with stating the case as one of
ignoring corporate personhood is that this flies in the face of corporate
personhood being what gets the corporation through the courthouse
doors in the first place. I will address this point in more detail below.
Relatedly, the problem with using the narrative of piercing is that
piercing is generally understood to be a means of imposing liability on
shareholders, not expanding the scope of their rights against regulation to
encompass their actions via the corporate form.74 Winkler acknowledges
this last point when he writes that:
The ordinary rule, ever since the days of Blackstone, is that
there is a strict separation between the corporation and the
people behind it. That is why the corporation, not the
stockholders, is liable if someone is injured using the
company’s products. In a small number of highly unusual
cases, however, the courts will pierce the corporate veil,
ignoring the separate legal status of the corporation and
imposing liability on the stockholders personally. Piercing
the corporate veil in business law cases is very rare, and
courts typically only do it when someone uses the
corporate form to perpetuate a fraud or commit
wrongdoing.75

Reverse piercing may be used to allow a plaintiff to access the assets of a corporation
owned by a defendant who has been found liable to the plaintiff. Ariella M. Lvov,
Preserving Limited Liability: Mitigating the Inequities of Reverse Veil Piercing with A Comprehensive
Framework, 18 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 161 (2018) (describing reverse piercing as “facilitating
access to a corporation’s assets for satisfaction of a wrongdoing-shareholder’s personal
debt”). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise
Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 235, 242 (2013) (“At least one court
has recognized the potential for using [reverse veil piercing] in the mandate cases, opining
that these cases ‘pose difficult questions of first impression,’ including whether it is
‘possible to ‘pierce the veil’ and disregard the corporate form in this context,’ which merit
‘more deliberate investigation.’”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or
Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 877, 902 (2016) (“[A]lthough the [Deveaux] Court held that a corporation
could be considered as a ‘company of individuals’ for jurisdictional purposes, it did not
suggest that it would pierce the corporate veil and look through to the individuals
comprising the corporation for any purposes that were not incidental to the corporation’s
existence -- such as spending money on a political campaign.”) (emphasis omitted).
74

75

WINKLER, supra note 73, at 55
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Perhaps these competing perspectives can be explained as flowing
from differences between corporate and constitutional law. As Winkler
describes it: “piercing the veil in business law cases is limited to rare cases
involving fraud or abuse; it is the exception, not the rule. In constitutional
law, by contrast, the exception would become the rule.”76 Or perhaps they
constitute a distinction without a difference.77 At the very least, it is likely
important for advocates to understand that they may get very different
reactions depending on whether they describe the justification for granting
corporations rights as being rooted in piercing the corporate veil or
ignoring corporate personhood, as opposed to acknowledging a need and
respect for corporate personhood, but focusing on the aggregate and/or
real entity theory of corporate personhood to justify the extension of
rights.
A word here about Masterpiece Cakeshop,78 the recent U.S. Supreme
Court case wherein a baker, operating in the corporate form, had been
found by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (CCRC) to have violated
the Colorado Anti–Discrimination Act by refusing to bake a wedding cake
for a same-sex couple due to his religious objection to same-sex marriage.
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the baker by a vote of 72, finding that that the CCRC had failed to comply with the U.S.
Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause’s requirement of religious neutrality
by displaying a hostility to religion in its proceedings.79 What is of
particular relevance here is that the Court completely ignored the
argument that the plaintiff in the case was a corporation rather than the
individual baker, and that at the very least the right of a corporation to
claim religious freedom under the U.S. Constitution had not yet been
decided, and that such a right should not be granted to corporations.80

76

WINKLER, supra note 73, at 67–68.

Cf. WINKLER, supra note 73, at 378 (“Romney and the justices used the language of
personhood but employed the logic of piercing. They called corporations ‘people,’ yet
pierced the corporate veil, looking right through the corporate form to base the decision
on the rights of the corporations’ members.”).
77

78

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).

Id. at 1729 (“The Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of [the baker’s] case has some
elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that
motivated his objection.”).
79

Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that
corporations had standing under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which is
understood to grant broader protection for religious exercise than the First Amendment).
80
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Leading up to the case, I signed on to the Brief of Amici Curiae
Corporate Law Professors, authored by Kent Greenfield81 and Daniel
Rubens,82 which argued in part that “because of the separate legal
personality of corporations and shareholders, the constitutional interests
of shareholders should not be projected onto the corporation.”83 Thus,
the Court certainly should have been aware of the issue. However, the
Court at least assumed for the purposes of the opinion that the
corporations both had standing, and that nothing about its corporate
status should differentiate the relevant analysis from what it would have
been had the plaintiff been a natural person.
Following issuance of the opinion, Winkler wrote a column in
Slate with the headline: Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Surprising Breadth: The
Supreme Court granted constitutional religious liberty to corporations—without
explaining why.84 Winkler did note the possibility that “future courts, when
confronted with corporate assertions of religious liberty, will say that
Masterpiece Cakeshop leaves the issue open and sets no definitive precedent,”
but further noted that history “suggests another outcome” because
corporations have repeatedly “won rights through Supreme Court
decisions that, like Masterpiece Cakeshop, provide little or no justification for
why corporations as such should be able to claim those rights.”85
To return to the theme of this section, it is likely too early to tell
whether Masterpiece Cakeshop will strengthen Winkler’s claim that corporate
rights expand when courts ignore corporate personhood, or whether the
issue will be deemed to have been left open, and future resolution will
involve at least some discussion of whether corporations are better
conceived of as mere associations of individuals, thereby embracing
aggregate or real entity theory, or state creations subject to greater
government control than natural persons, thereby embracing concession
/ artificial entity theory.86
81

Professor and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School.

82

Senior Associate, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.

Brief of Amici Curiae Corporate Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 3,
Masterpiece Cakeship, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16111).
83

Available at https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/masterpiece-cakeshopgrants-constitutional-religious-liberty-rights-to-corporations.html.
84

85

Id. at 2.

Cf. Howard Kislowicz, Business Corporations as Religious Freedom Claimants in Canada (“The
argument for categorically denying a corporation’s religious freedom claims usually rests
on a conception of what the corporation is: as an artificial person, a corporation simply
86
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DEBATING DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward87 is routinely cited as representative of
concession theory.88 G. Richard Shell provides a general description of
the case:
In Dartmouth College the Court held that the state of New
Hampshire violated the contract clause of the U.S.
Constitution by attempting to revoke a royal charter
granted to Dartmouth College before the American
Revolution. Justice Story opined that the Constitution
would not be offended by changes in state corporation law
if the state conditioned the granting of its charters with a
reserved power to alter or amend the corporate statute.
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 675, 712 (Story, J.,
concurring). This lawyerly advice led to enactment of
‘reserve power’ clauses in all state corporation statutes
under which states reserved the right to alter, amend, or
repeal provisions of their corporate codes without
constitutional limitation.89
As also previously noted, the characterization of Dartmouth College
as representative of concession theory stems primarily from the following
and related language in the opinion:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly,
or as incidental to its very existence. . . . The objects for
which a corporation is created are universally such as the
government wishes to promote.90

cannot hold the requisite religious or conscientious belief to ground such a claim.”),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3001258.
87

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).

88

See supra note 36.

G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 517, 544 n.175
(1989).
89

90

Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. 518, 636–37 (1819).
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However, in We the Corporations, Prof. Winkler describes this
characterization as a mistake.91 Instead, Winkler posits that the opinion
and quoted language represents more piercing of the corporate veil and
ignoring of corporate personhood in order to expand corporate rights:
[W]hen Marshall echoed his line from Bank of the United
States and described the corporation in Dartmouth College as
“an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law,” he was offering a justification
for once again rejecting corporate personhood. The
artificiality and invisibility of the corporation made it
appropriate to look right through the corporation to focus
instead on the members.92
While it is true that Dartmouth College could have treated the corporation as
subject to even greater state control than it did, the oft-quoted language –
particularly that being “the mere creature of law,” a corporation
“possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it,” and that the “objects for which a corporation is created are
universally such as the government wishes to promote” – is simply not
congruent with the view that corporations are merely associations of
individuals. Rather, the language quite clearly expresses the view that
corporations are materially different from natural persons, and that this
difference is rooted in the state’s role in their creation and scope of rights.
Having said that, the opinion just as clearly does not ignore the
natural persons carrying out the various roles that make corporations
manifest, and it places meaningful constitutional limits on the state’s power
to amend the bargain it has entered into with those people, absent
adequate notice.93 So how should an advocate use the opinion?

See ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON
THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 66 (2018) (“Although some have mistakenly interpreted that
language in Dartmouth College to mean that Marshall embraced corporate personhood, in
fact he meant the opposite. Marshall was saying that corporations were too ethereal to
be the basis for constitutional rights and that, instead, the court should focus on the
corporation’s members.”).
91

ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR
CIVIL RIGHTS 86–87 (2018).
92

Cf. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 14, 69 (1992) (“Advocates of Contract Clause protection for shareholders
are aware of the ‘reserve’ clauses resulting from Dartmouth College, but they appear to
underestimate the full import of these powers. States have ‘reserved’ the freedom ... to
‘impair’ the rights of shareholders . . . .”).
93
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My advice to advocates intending to make use of the opinion, or
likely to encounter it, is to recognize that the artificial entity / concession
theory language is just too strong, and the history of the opinion being
cited as standing for those theories too long, to think it effective to start
citing and discussing it as representative of aggregate theory or piercing.94
However, depending on the advocate’s goals, noting the emphasis of the
opinion on the contractual nature of the corporation, as well as the fact
that the opinion limited government intrusion into the workings of the
corporation by at least in part highlighting its private rather than public
status, are important qualifications to at least be aware of.
VI.

DOES CORPORATE PERSONHOOD MATTER?

In We the Corporations, Winkler writes that “[t]oday’s critics of
Citizens United often blame corporate personhood for the Supreme Court’s
expansive protection of corporate rights. Yet historically, the logic of
personhood has usually been employed by populists seeking to narrow or
On August 24, 2018, I ran a Westlaw search for “‘Dartmouth College’ /s (‘concession
theory’ ‘artificial entity’).” The search returned 18 secondary source citations, and a quick
review of the five most cited shows that four of the five positively associate Dartmouth
College with concession theory in at least some manner. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond
Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 14, 68 (1992)
(“[T]he new Contract Clause challenge asks courts to accept the recently minted and
influential ‘contracts theory’ of the corporation. This theory derides the ‘concession
theory’ of the corporation attributable to Dartmouth College . . ..”); Henry N. Butler &
Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 767, 774 (1989)
(“the ‘concession’ theory . . . view of the corporation was stated in the first great
corporation case of this country, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward”); Elizabeth
Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1629, 1635 (2011) (“Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, illustrates how the concession theory animated the
Supreme Court’s early view of the corporation”); Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining
the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors’ Duties to
Creditors, 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 101 (1995) (“As recently as 1987, the Supreme Court has
quoted with approval the concession theory articulated in Dartmouth.”) (citing CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987)). But see Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither
Contract Nor Concession: The Public Personality of the Corporation, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 201,
209 (2006) (“The stark and simple alternatives of contract and concession have transfixed
and distracted us, ultimately preventing us from seeing that Dartmouth College treated the
corporation not as a creature of the state, but as an “immortal being” and formidable
personality whose life was to be governed not on the basis of contract, but on principles
of trust.”). Cf. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 428 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“‘the notion that business corporations could invoke the First Amendment
would probably have been quite a novelty,’ given that ‘at the [founding], the legitimacy of
every corporate activity was thought to rest entirely in a concession of the sovereign’”)
(quoting Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 541, 578
(1991), and citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636, 4 L.Ed. 629
(1819)).
94
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limit the rights of corporations.”95 Elsewhere, he argues that “for those
today who wish to see the Supreme Court restrict the constitutional rights
of corporations, looking back to Webster’s era reveals a potential model.
By embracing corporate personhood, rather than piercing the corporate
veil, the Taney court imposed boundaries on the rights of corporations.”96
Putting aside questions about Webster’s era,97 piercing the corporate veil,98
and the role of Taney in the corporate civil rights movement,99 these
quotes, along with others in the book, could be read to suggest that
Winkler views progressive attempts to rein in corporate power by seeking
to end corporate personhood as counter-productive. In fact, rather than
seeking to end corporate personhood, Winkler argues these advocates
should seek to strengthen it.
There’s a lot to unpack here, but the point I want to focus on is
that there is a distinction between corporate personhood as a basis for
legal standing, and corporate personhood as a justification for the scope
of rights granted once standing is granted.100 Hobby Lobby provides a good
example of the distinction. While Winkler acknowledges that a major
issue in the case was whether corporations are persons under the relevant
statute (in this case the Religious Freedom Restoration Act), he ultimately
concludes that “[p]roperly understood, Alito’s decision, like Citizens United,

95

Winkler, supra note 91, at 62.

96

Id. at 75.

Cf. Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract Nor Concession: The Public Personality of the
Corporation, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 201, 231 (2006) (“Daniel Webster, who represented
the trustees in Dartmouth College, thought that the notable feature of his era was that
‘public improvements are brought about by a voluntary association and combination.’”)
(quoting Arthur M. Schlesinger, Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 Am. Hist. Rev. 1,
9 n.16 (1944)).
97

98

See supra notes 72–86.

See Winkler, supra note 91 at xix (“Chief Justice Roger Taney, the author of the
infamous Dred Scott case, whose reactionary views on race have left him one of the most
reviled figures in the history of the Supreme Court, was one of the most forceful
advocates for limiting the constitutional rights of corporations.”).
99

Cf. Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United, Corporate Personhood, and Nexus of Contracts
Theory (Jan. 21, 2010) (“Government regulation of corporations obviously impacts the
people for whose relationships the corporate serves as a nexus. . .. It’s useful to allow the
corporation to provide those persons with a single voice when seeking constitutional
protections. Indeed, doing so is not just useful, it is necessary to protect the rights of the
parties to those various contracts.”), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-corporate-personhood-and-nexusof-contracts-theory.html.
100
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represented a rejection of corporate personhood.”101 How are we to
understand this apparent contradiction?
Perhaps a better way of understanding Hobby Lobby is to view
corporate personhood as being essential to granting religious exercise
rights to corporations because, after all, had a majority of the court
concluded, as the dissent argued, that corporations are unable to exercise
religion and thus should not be deemed persons under the statute, then
the case would have ended there, and the corporations would not have
been allowed to claim exemption from generally applicable laws by way of
an accommodation of their religious exercise rights. On the other hand,
once corporations are deemed persons under the statute, we are still left
with the question of what type of person they should be treated as. There
are a number of Supreme Court cases that differentiate the extent to
which certain types of natural persons can claim certain rights, balancing
the needs of the person against the needs of society and the state in a
particular context.102 So, when Winkler says Alito rejected corporate
personhood, he may be better understood to be saying that Alito rejected
any conception of corporate personhood that would differentiate the
rights of the corporations from those of the average citizen. In other
words, Alito adopted the aggregate or perhaps real entity view of the
corporation, and rejected the artificial entity / concession theory.
Thus, progressive advocates for limiting corporate power arguably
are justified in both (1) seeking to end corporate personhood, and (2)
seeking to advance a theory of corporate personhood that highlights the
distinction between the corporate entity and, for example, the
shareholders of that corporation. Furthermore, when Winkler argues that
“for those today who wish to see the Supreme Court restrict the
constitutional rights of corporations, looking back to Webster’s era reveals
a potential model,” he may best be understood as referring to the model
of concession theory.103
Winkler, supra note 91, at 381 (“as with many previous Supreme Court cases invoking
corporate personhood, the underlying logic of Hobby Lobby reflected instead piercing the
corporate veil”).
101

Cf. Catherine Hardee, Who’s Causing the Harm (“Under Hobby Lobby, the answer to who
is causing the harm is neither a corporation nor an individual, but rather an individual
granted the powers and privileges afforded corporations under state law.”), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3237116.
102

Winkler, supra note 91, at 75 (“Moreover, for those today who wish to see the Supreme
Court restrict the constitutional rights of corporations, looking back to Webster’s era
reveals a potential model. By embracing corporate personhood, rather than piercing the
corporate veil, the Taney court imposed boundaries on the rights of corporations.”).
Comparing this quote to the following authored by Justice Taney in the case of Ohio Life
103
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CONCLUSION

Adam Winkler has written an excellent book on the history of
corporate rights. Hopefully, this Essay adds something of value to that
work, however small, by pointing out some of the ways in which advocates
relying on the book’s analysis should proceed with caution. In the end,
comparing the lens of piercing-versus-personality to aggregate-versusconcession may provide opportunities for other arguments. For example,
by pointing out how treating corporations as mere associations of
individuals is akin to piercing the corporate veil, the risk that approach
creates for limited liability may be highlighted. In addition, by explaining
concession / artificial entity theory as a means of actually respecting the
separateness of corporate personhood, the stigma that has accompanied
those theories in recent memory can be replaced with a more balanced
view that those theories at bottom seek simply to recognize the central
role of the state in a corporation’s existence.104

Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. 416 (1853), arguably provides at least some basis for
describing the relevant model as concession theory.
The grant of privileges and exemptions to a corporation are strictly
construed against the corporation, and in favor of the public. Nothing
passes but what is granted in clear and explicit terms. And neither the
right of taxation nor any other power of sovereignty which the
community have an interest in preserving, undiminished, will be held
by the court to be surrendered, unless the intention to surrender is
manifested by words too plain to be mistaken.
Id. at 435.
Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees:
Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 777 n.237 (1998)
(describing modern day arguments that constitute “a variant on the old concession
theory,” but nonetheless concluding that “[i]t has been a long time since mainstream
corporate legal theory took the concession theory seriously”).
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